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1. Introduction 
In his seminal article, ‘Price theory and oligopoly’ (Rothschild 1947), Kurt Rothschild critically 
reviews recent developments in the theory of imperfect competition and puts forward several 
ideas on how the theory might develop in the future. Subsequent developments in the theory of 
imperfect competition have shown the fruitfulness of his ideas. In this paper we review these 
developments and discuss the correspondence to Rothschild’s original propositions. We also 
discuss ideas from Rothschild (1947) and his later writings that can stimulate developments in 
price theory in the future. 
The main theoretical works discussed in Rothschild (1947) are Edward Chamberlin’s 
Theory of Monopolistic Competition (Chamberlin, 1932) and Joan Robinson’s Theory of 
Imperfect Competition (Robinson 1933). Rothschild hails these works as major advances in 
theory as they brought a large number of new cases into the formal theory of markets, extending 
the theory that had previously relied predominantly on the two polar cases of perfect competition 
and pure monopoly. However, he notes that while these advances allow theory to be applied to 
cases, such as product differentiation across firms, which had been treated as exceptions in the 
theory of competition and monopoly, they do not go far in dealing with interdependence of firms 
and the resulting indeterminateness of pricing outcomes. 
 Rothschild notes the hesitancy of economists to move away from theory that provides 
the type of determinateness for price found in the theory of competition and monopoly. He also 
notes that the tools available for properly examining pricing behaviour when firms are 
interdependent had not yet been developed.1
                                                          
1 He comments perceptively on the potential to tackle these problems using the analysis presented in the book. 
Theories of Games and Economic Behavior, that had just been published by Morgenstern and von Neumann (1944), 
even though he had to rely only on review articles to make this judgment (see Rothschild (1947, p. 306, fn. 4). The 
development of game theory as a framework for analysing price behaviour has been impressive. However, 
Rothschild (1993) points to limits to extent to which game theory has been successful in dealing with 
interdependence in oligopoly pricing and continues to support the pursuit of alternative approaches. Thus, game 
theory is only discussed peripherally in this paper.  
 However, he suggests ‘a general approach which – 
while much less elegant than traditional price theory – promises a more realistic treatment of the 
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oligopoly problem.’ (Rothschild, 1947, p. 307)  He then proceeds to set out ‘some considerations 
to which this approach gives rise.’ (ibid)  
The remainder of this paper concentrates on reviewing developments in research on 
oligopoly theory and related empirical research on pricing in oligopoly over the years since the 
publication of Rothschild (1947), focussing in particular on developments related to the 
considerations proposed by Rothschild. We examine, in order, research on the topics of price 
rigidity and other pricing practices, non-price competition and barriers to entry, internal 
organisation of the firm, and the political and economic power exerted by large firms. In the 
process, we examine later writings by Rothschild that relate to these topics. We then conclude by 
reviewing Rothschild’s writings for guidance on considerations that might fruitfully be explored 
in future research related to price theory. 
 
2. Price rigidity and other pricing practices 
Essential to the propositions in Rothschild (1947) is the notion that in oligopoly ‘a “struggle for 
position” is taking place side by side with an attempt to make the best of every position that is 
held at any special moment’ (Rothschild, 1947, p. 309-10). Also, important is the treatment of 
price as a dynamic phenomenon in the sense that the implications of a price at any point in time 
for a firm’s position relative to its current rivals, its customers and its potential rivals need to be 
taken into account. This leads Rothschild to conclude that, ‘Since, therefore, the quoted price is 
not the mechanic result of impersonal market forces nor the essential adjustment to a constantly 
changing environment, but the expression of a strategic policy, it is clear that there will be a 
tendency for its rigid maintenance.’ (Rothschild, 1947, p. 311) 
Price rigidity was not a new concept in economics. As Rothschild (1947) notes, Hall and 
Hitch (1939) had reported findings from interviews with businessmen in which price rigidity 
featured as an observed phenomenon. Also, Sweezy (1939) had put forward the theoretical 
explanation of rigid prices based on kinked demand curves. However, rather than rely on 
empirical evidence as in Hall and Hitch or on a profit-maximising model as in Sweezy, 
Rothschild’s proposition regarding price rigidity is based on his general approach that situates 
oligopoly behaviour in the context of the struggle for position and making the best out of every 
position at any special moment. 
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Rothschild abandons the neoclassical approach, which is universal in the sense that it is 
derived from axioms, such as profit maximisation, that are meant to apply to every situation. 
Instead, he pursues an approach that is general in the sense of having broad applicability, but 
with recognition that prices are subject to other influences not incorporated within the general 
theory. 2
The mainstream of neoclassical economics has never accepted price rigidity as a 
pervasive characteristic of oligopoly. Both the logic and the empirical support for the proposition 
have been strongly attacked. One serious logical problem is that the theory is incomplete, as it 
explains why prices don’t change but not how the fixed price is determined (see Reid, 1981 for a 
full discussion). Price rigidity can at best be considered as a theory of price in the short run, a 
theory of price change or rather lack of price change, but it is not a theory determining the price 
level and certainly not a theory of price in the long run. The empirical attack has been focussed 
on the distinction between posted prices and transaction prices, with the latter shown to be much 
more flexible than the former (see Stigler and Kindahl, 1970 for evidence on this point). 
 The term, strategic policy, combined with the notion of struggle, reflects the 
environment of uncertainty in which oligopoly firms operate. Rothschild notes that oligopoly 
firms have a security motive as well as a profit motive (Rothschild, 1947, p. 308). Further, there 
is scope for judgement and for taking definite positions in the market, which would be 
unjustified in an environment of certainty or rational expectations. The firms make choices that 
are not the unique outcome of external conditions. Price rigidity is a feature of oligopoly in this 
sense in that changes in cost or demand conditions don’t necessarily lead to changes in price.  
Rothschild’s point is that the tendency to maintain rigid prices is a pricing practice 
notable specifically in the context of oligopoly, because it is when firms are engaged in the 
struggle for market position and aware of their interdependence that this type of behaviour makes 
sense. Immediately after arguing for the rigidity of quoted prices, Rothschild (1947, p. 312) adds 
that, ‘Oligopolistic circumstances lead to a multitude of conditions surrounding the quoted price.’ 
He recognizes deviations from posted prices as a common occurrence and further discusses 
circumstances that lead to purposeful deviation from the normal practice of maintaining fixed 
posted prices, including the aggressive pursuit of a stronger market position (Rothschild, 1947, 
pp.313-317). Thus, attacks on the theoretical and empirical validity of price rigidity do not 
                                                          
2 These other influences are not simply random shocks that have no systematic impact on the equilibrium outcome, 
as in neoclassical theory. Rather, they impact on the outcome in a systematic way, but only under special 
circumstances that are considered in more detailed analysis on a case-by-case basis. 
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directly address the proposition put forward by Rothschild, which is that the circumstances of 
oligopoly lead firms to try to maintain fixed prices as a normal business practice in 
circumstances where profit maximisation would suggest a pattern of fluctuating prices. 
Price rigidity remains controversial in economics, but its practical relevance has 
dissipated in an era of endemic inflation. Rigid prices are not an appropriate business practice for 
achieving a secure position when costs and prices of substitute products are normally rising. 
Rather, maintaining rigid prices would lead to steadily declining profit margins under such 
circumstances, which would undermine the financial stability of the firm.  Thus, alternative 
pricing practices are required for oligopoly under inflationary conditions. This is fully consistent 
with Rothschild’s general theory of pricing in oligopoly. 
An alternative pricing principle discussed briefly in Rothschild (1947) is full-cost pricing 
of the type identified by Hall and Hitch (1939) in their interviews with businessmen. Rothschild 
suggests that this type of pricing is a 
 
‘perfectly logical outcome of the market situation with which they were primarily 
concerned – monopolistic competition with an admixture of oligopoly’ as alternative 
pricing practices... When, however, the position of the oligopolists or duopolists is more 
powerful and not easily invaded they will not keep to the full-cost principle, but will add 
varying and " abnormal " profit percentages to their costs  in proportion to their assumed 
strength, or they will fix prices without reference to costs altogether.’  (Rothschild, 1947, 
pp.311)  
 
The general form of pricing practice covered by this passage is mark-up pricing, prices that are 
set by adding a percentage profit margin to some measure of unit cost.  
Mark-up pricing satisfies the basic requirements of Rothschild’s general theory of pricing 
in oligopoly in that it is a practice that allows firms to maintain a degree of stability in the 
struggle for position while doing the best they can at any special moment. When all firms in an 
industry follow mark-up pricing rules and face similar inflationary cost increases, their relative 
position in price can be maintained and the threat of price wars minimised. This is the scenario 
discussed by Rothschild (1993) in a comparison of a Stackleberg model of oligopoly with a 
model that he labels the “Sylos approach” in that it is based on the work of Sylos-Labini (1969, 
1979 and 1987). Rothschild (1993, p.169) concludes the comparison by stating that, ‘Openness 
of approach can be important. From this point of view case studies, numerical and graphical 
exercises, and so on, have a role to play in addition to or in place more “exact” but less open 
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analytical methods – more so in the sphere of oligopoly than in other branches of price and 
market structure theory.’ 
Variants of mark-up pricing are dominant in the post-Keynesian theory of pricing (see 
Lee, 1998).  Applying mark-up pricing to the manufacturing sector of economy, which is 
generally characterized by oligopoly, provides a powerful tool in analysing aggregate economic 
activity. In particular, Kalecki (1971) shows how the distribution of income in the economy 
evolves over the business cycle by combining mark-up pricing in oligopoly with competitive 
pricing in primary production. Similar models are widely applied by other authors for analysing 
many aspects of income distribution and inflation.3  Indeed, Rothschild (1972) in his analysis of 
pricing in an inflationary environment directly applies a variant of mark-up pricing.4
As with price rigidity, mark-up pricing is not a complete theory of pricing. It is a theory 
of price change, but not the price level.  In particular, in the context of oligopoly an explanation 
of the size of the mark-up is required to complete the link between the cost level and the price 
level. Rothschild (1947) considers factors affecting the gap between cost and price in only a 
general way, but there is substantial analysis of these factors in the post-Keynesian literature 
cited above. 
  
 
3. Non-price competition and barriers to entry 
Rothschild (1947) makes scant mention of non-price competition and does not deal directly with 
issue of barriers to entry aside from a very perceptive comment on the endogeneity of market 
structure that is discussed below. Rothschild’s article was written before the seminal 
contributions of Bain (1956) and Sylos-Labini (1969), which introduced the threat of entry as a 
main consideration in the pricing behaviour of oligopoly. This section discusses these 
contributions and subsequent developments in the analysis of non-price competition and barriers 
to entry so as to assess the implications for price theory. 
The most direct implication for price theory of non-price competition and barriers to 
entry is in the entry-limiting-price model as discussed in the seminal works of Bain (1956) and 
Sylos-Labini (1969) (the Italian original of 1956 is exposited in Modigliani. 1958), which 
                                                          
3 See, for example, applications to the analysis of inflation in Beckerman and Jenkinson (1986) and Bloch, et al 
(2004). 
4 In Rothschild (1972) prices rise by a fixed proportion of unit costs plus a percentage that depends on the phase of 
the business cycle. This ignores the role of raw material costs and results in a percentage profit margin that varies 
over the business cycle, but roughly captures the spirit of cost-plus pricing rules. 
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identifies a maximum price by incumbents to deter entry of new competitors. Spence (1977) 
reassesses this model in emphasising early capital accumulation helping incumbents to build 
large capacity and to make plausible the threat to lower price after entry. Caves and Porter (1977, 
p.261) generalise this approach stating, ‘as an investment decision made under uncertainty and 
conjectural interdependence, and by recognizing that subgroup structures of industries impede 
intra-industry mobility, we have sought to generalize the theory of barriers to entry into a theory 
of mobility barriers that takes a consistent and comprehensive view of the decision-making 
behaviour of both nascent and going firms.’  
The work of Spence (1977) and Caves and Porter (1977) raise doubt on the ability of 
incumbents to use the threat of lower prices after entry as an effective deterrent to potential 
entrants. These doubts are amplified in the application of game theory to the investment 
decisions of incumbents and entrants by Dixit (1979 and 1980). Milgrom and Roberts (1982) 
further develop this line of inquiry by assuming asymmetry of information between the 
incumbent and the entrant may happen, where low demand or low marginal cost is signalled by 
the incumbent to limit entry by the entrant. Under conditions of full information and complete 
markets, Baumol, Panzar and Willig (1982, p.82) consider high sunk cost in defining an entry 
barrier in a contestable market as ‘anything that requires an expenditure by a new entrant into an 
industry, but imposes no equivalent cost upon an incumbent’. At this point, the idea that 
incumbents can use low prices to deter entry disappears completely from the horizon.  
Much of the early research on entry barriers is based on the structure-conduct-
performance paradigm, which ignores the dynamics of industry adjustment. In this paradigm, the 
number and size distribution of firms in an industry (as measured, for example, in a 
concentration ratio) determine profitability. Essentially, it is high entry barriers, rather than firm 
price or non-price behaviour, which result in highly concentrated industries and allow firms in 
these industries to persist in earning higher profits in without eroding their position.5
This view of exogenously determined market structure is challenged by Rothschild (1947) 
in another of his prescient commentaries of the state of existing theory. Rothschild notes,  
  
 
‘these theories are all based on the assumption that the oligopolists while recognising that 
their price activities will call forth reactions from their rivals-acquiesce in the permanent 
                                                          
5 Mueller (1986) provides detailed evidence on the extent of persistence of profits and Warning (1996) summarizes 
the literature on factors affecting profit persistence across industries. 
7 
 
nature of the industry's structure. But since it is doubtless one of the distinguishing 
characteristics of duopoly and oligopoly that the rival firms can actively influence and 
change the market situation, these theories, too, fail to provide a theoretical framework 
for the interpretation of reality.’ (Rothschild, 1947, pp. 303)  
 
 
Some fifty years later, Sutton (1991, 1998) addresses this issue in an application of game 
theory to the conceptual inadequacies of the structure-conduct performance paradigm. Sutton 
argues that a definitive inverse relation is expected between concentration and market size as a 
barrier to entry, only as long as set-up costs for the industry are exogenously determined. Large 
markets are possible with a few large firms instead of a large number of firms as long as the few 
firms have available a strategy of high expenditures on items that enhance their market position, 
such as advertising and research and development, provided those expenditures have no market 
value outside of current operations (they are “sunk costs”).  Sutton (1991) tests this hypothesis 
with twenty narrowly defined food and drink industries across six developed countries. Further 
evidence in support of Sutton’s proposition is provided by Robinson and Chang (1996) for a 
cross-section of US consumer and industrial goods manufacturing and by Bhattacharya and 
Bloch (2000) for a cross-section of Australian manufacturing industries. 
In Sutton’s analysis, pricing does not play a role in the long-run steady-state structure of 
an industry. However, a potential role emerges in considering the process of adjustment to the 
steady state. Empirical studies of the adjustment of industrial concentration towards a steady 
state generally find that adjustment is very slow, approaching steady state at rates of no more 
than a few percentage points a year. High prices might speed or slow the adjustment process by 
affecting the timing of the investment decisions of either incumbent firms or potential entrants, 
for example by providing more internal finance for incumbents or reducing the risk of short-run 
losses for entrants. However, there is no clear evidence of a strong impact of profitability on the 
speed of adjustment.6
In recent decades, the structure of many industries has changed substantially, particularly 
due to the globalization, liberalization and privatization across industries and countries. 
Transnational corporations are increasingly expanding boundaries along with local firms. The 
whole process opens up both opportunities and threats to the industries. The role of entry barriers 
 
                                                          
6 See Bhattacharya and Bloch (2000) for some estimates for a cross-section of Australian manufacturing industries 
and for a review of earlier studies on the speed of adjustment.  
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has evolved from the era of Bain and Sylos-Labini to that of Sutton’s research. The importance 
of non-price competition strategies (research and development, advertising, variety of products, 
product quality, etc) has increased over time in explaining competition within modern industries 
as compared to pricing strategies.7
 
 The exact calculation of price associated with entry-limiting 
pricing has been generally abandoned in theoretical models, but a general proposition that entry 
barriers do lead to higher prices relative to unit production costs remains (especially when the 
“sunk costs” associated with building barriers to entry are excluded from production costs). This 
proposition fits well with Rothschild’s general theory of pricing in oligopoly, where barriers to 
entry are taken to be one of the other factors that must be kept in mind when considering pricing 
practices in oligopoly.  
 
4. Internal organization 
The growing scale and scope of firms had progressed sufficiently to be noted in Rothschild 
(1947) and is later discussed by Rothschild in relation to the power of transnational corporations 
(see the next section below). Large diversified firms develop complex internal structures to be 
able to manage their extensive and diverse operations. This complexity in turn influences 
decision making in the firm, including their pricing practices. (Rothschild, 1947, p. 313) notes 
the implications for pricing theory, stating that ‘Prices are therefore increasingly the outcome of 
the different pulls of the conflicting interests of various departments.’  This idea has not been 
directly developed further in subsequent literature, but there has been substantial development of 
the theory of organisation within the firm. At least some of this literature has implications for the 
strategies adopted by firms, including the way in which they compete in price and non-price 
dimensions. This section is devoted to discussing this literature and its implications for pricing 
theory in oligopoly. 
Penrose (1959) provides a seminal contribution to the theory of organisation of the 
modern firm. Penrose argues that with modern forms of internal organisation there is no 
constraint on the size of firms. Large size brings with it the advantages of productivity gains 
from the division of labour, with large firms able to take advantage of the highly specialised 
                                                          
7For example, using data for 46 major product innovations, Agarwal and Gort (2001) find that the average duration 
of between the commercial introduction of a new product and its imitation by competitors declined from 33 years 
at the beginning of the century to 3.4 years for the two decades, 1967 to 1986. 
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skills and knowledge of individual workers. However, specialisation of knowledge implies a lack 
of shared knowledge, which contributes to the conflicts of interest noted by Rothschild and the 
consequent need for mechanisms for coordination and the managing of conflict. Further, the 
need to share knowledge implies that the growth rate of a firm is constrained by the diversion of 
managerial effort to train and integrate new managers as the scale and scope of the firm expands. 
Innovation is a key requirement for success in the modern large firm, which means the 
continual introduction of new knowledge to the firm. This adds to the complexity of the modern 
firm as discussed by Bloch and Metcalfe (2011). Therein, it is noted that such complexity 
contributes to the adoption of simplified rules and routines as mechanisms for decision making, 
providing a further rationale for the prevalence of rule-based pricing practices, such as 
maintaining rigid prices or basing prices on fixed mark ups over unit cost. Modern firms have to 
deal with complexity from within as well as interdependence from without. 
It is interesting to compare the complexity view of the firm with the developments in 
mainstream analysis of the organisation of the firm. Here, the main focus in answering why firms 
exist and what determines their boundaries in terms of size and scope has been on transactions 
costs. Following Coase (1937), the basic mainstream argument has been that firms exist to 
economise on costs that would otherwise be incurred in organising transactions among 
independent workers, suppliers of materials and owners of capital equipment. Likewise, firm 
boundaries are determined to minimise the sum of transaction costs across all firms. This 
approach fits neatly with the axiomatic approach to production and consumption of neoclassical 
economics, but presumes a well informed process operating both within firms and across markets. 
Rothschild’s continual warnings about the dangers of pursuing theoretical elegance at the 
expense of relevance are particularly appropriate here. 
In practice, firm boundaries are blurred in modern industrial world. For example, 
compare the Japanese form of industry organisation with strong inter-firm relationships to 
fiercely independent European and American firms. The former have cooperated effectively to 
enhance their competitiveness in the world market since World War II (Caves and Uekusa, 1976). 
This provides an illustration of how firm boundaries (level of integration), the structure of 
financial markets (in raising capital and develop innovative activities), formal (inter-firm 
agreements and complementary capabilities) and informal organisational structure (culture of 
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workforce, managerial complexity) and historical path dependence are significant in determining 
competitive strategies of transnational firms.  
Case studies provide insight into the extent to which competitive strategy is influenced by 
internal structure. A powerful illustration is provided by Chandler (1990), particularly focussing 
on the role of investment within organisations in building modern capitalism.  In a review, Teece 
(1993, p.200) suggests ‘Chandler has grasped some fundamental facets of enterprise 
performance largely neglected by economic theory –facets which must come into shape focus if 
economists are to understand the new forms of business organizations, financial institutions , 
governance systems, and policies needed to develop and exploit the wave of new industrial 
technologies which are upon us.” Modern firms are based on a variety of organisational 
mechanisms in determining cost and pricing structure.  
Teece, et al (1994) develop the concept of ‘coherence’ of the multiproduct business firm. 
Enterprise learning, path dependencies and nature of selection environment are found to be 
significant in determining diversity amongst modern firms. The influence of the selection 
environment in determining the outcomes of strategy, particularly innovation strategy, is 
explored in detail by Nelson and Winter (1982) in their evolutionary approach to firm and 
organisational behaviour. 
 
5. Power 
Rothschild (1947) emphasizes that oligopoly raises concerns for power well beyond influence in 
the marketplace. In particular, the large amounts spent on lobbying by large oligopoly firms are 
noted as playing a role in shaping the firms’ position comparable to the role played by amounts 
spent on advertising. Rothschild puts forward the proposition that, 
 
‘The oligopolistic struggle for position and security includes political action of all sorts 
right up to imperialism. The inclusion of these "non-economic" elements is essential for a 
full explanation of oligopoly behaviour and price.’ (Rothschild, 1947, p. 317, italics in 
original) 
 
The importance of power in pricing theory and other areas of economics is a theme that 
continually appears in Rothschild’s writings. He devotes one of his last articles, Rothschild 
(2002), to a detailed critique of neoclassical economics for its failure to include the consideration 
11 
 
of power. Here, he notes that, ‘The neglect of power in mainstream economics has its main roots 
rather in deliberate strategies to remove power questions to a subordinate position for inner-
theoretical reasons.’  (Rothschild, 2002, p. 437) These inner-theoretical reasons are partly 
methodological, particularly the desire to maintain an axiom-based theory that provides exact 
results and thereby avoids fuzzy notions embraced by other social sciences, and partly 
ideological, especially the pursuit of favour from powerful interests within society who benefit 
from the laissez-faire implications of neoclassical economics. 
A specific concern related to the use of power by oligopoly firms in their modern guise of 
transnational corporations is taken up in Rothschild (2005). Here, transnational firms are noted 
as using their power of location of activity to enhance their position relative to parties that are 
unable to migrate, particularly small businesses and labour as well as national and local 
governments. The result is higher profits for the transnationals through reduced input prices and 
production costs. In terms of pricing for outputs not much is expected to change. Rothschild 
states that, ‘Competition within the transnational sector will continue to run according to existing 
theories of price and output determination.’ (Rothschild, 2005, p. 446, italics in original)  
As Rothschild maintained a stream of commentary on the treatment, or rather neglect, of 
power in economic analysis, we do not comment further on the literature. However, events of 
recent years provide compelling examples of the use of state power to the advantage of large 
firms, particularly in the financial sector. The use of public funds to prop up large banks and 
other financial firms has nearly bankrupted several economies (and may yet do so), while others 
in society have had to deal with the impact of severe austerity programs. Mainstream economists 
have been quick to defend the interventions as necessary to maintaining the integrity of the 
international financial system and avoiding a banking panic. However, they have not been so 
quick to provide a compelling theory of why governments allowed banks to become “too big to 
fail” or become so highly leveraged that they were unable to survive a large shock of their own 
creation. More directly of concern to price theory is the pressure being applied to governments to 
find ways of driving down domestic wages, at the same time as propping up prices by protecting 
domestic producers, including domestic subsidiaries of transnational corporations, from foreign 
competition, including through the use of tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers. 
 
6. Ideas for the next generation 
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Rothschild’s (1947) seminal paper on price and oligopoly aimed to provide guidance to 
subsequent researchers and he clearly did that with at least some of his propositions and 
discussion. Price theory has developed in a number of different dimensions to deal with his main 
insight of that oligopoly is a struggle for position, requiring an analysis that is much more than 
the application of an elegant profit-maximising calculus. Rothschild was consistent throughout 
his life in arguing for an open and realistic approach to economic theorizing, including price 
theory. As detailed above, there has been considerable progress of this sort in price theory 
through developments in rule-based pricing practices, such as mark-up pricing, endogenous 
market structure, the analysis of the impact of internal firm organisation on strategic policy and 
the use (and abuse) or both market and political power by oligopoly firms. However, much 
remains to be done along lines suggested by Rothschild in his time. 
Power remains a key element of the economy that requires further examination. As noted 
immediately above, the exercise of state power to promote private interests is prominent in the 
factors leading up to and following the global financial crisis. Economists from Adam Smith 
onward have been strong critics of state power being used to pursue private interest and have 
even provided a theory of public choice based on the axioms of private optimization. However, 
the policy prescriptions from the mainstream for dealing with the problem fail to go beyond 
advocating laissez faire. As Rothschild notes, these policy prescriptions are long standing and 
flawed, 
 
‘The trouble began … by concentrating many of its analyses on the actions of single self-
interested individuals in a competitive world. While competition certainly still exists, the 
individual behavior and the extent and type of competition have dramatically changed 
since Smith’s days and these changes suggest very clearly that today it might be—more 
than ever—a big mistake to regard the power problem as a quantité negligable. 
(Rothschild, 2002, p.436) 
 
Power affects pricing directly through various state interventions into the market, 
including price controls, subsidies, taxes, tariffs and other restraints on trade. Power also affects 
pricing indirectly through the regulation of market structure, industrial relations, consumer 
protection and environmental controls, as well as a host of other legislative, regulatory and 
judicial interventions. More generally, power influences the whole structure of society and the 
course of development through time, including the provision of education, the development of 
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technology, the degree of inequality in income and the extent of economic and political freedom 
for individuals. Rothschild was clearly on the mark arguing that this is a core issue for 
economics rather than a quantité negligable. 
The internal organisation of firms remains a fertile ground for further development of 
price theory. Rothschild (1947) noted conflicts of interest within the firm as being one possible 
influence on pricing. As noted above, the complexity of the modern firm contributes to the 
adoption of rules and routines, including rule-based pricing practices such as mark-up pricing. 
More generally, coordinating the specialised knowledge within a firm, and managing the 
conflicts that arise, impacts on the type of competitive strategies adopted by a firm. The link 
between internal organisation and competitive strategy remains to be fully explored. 
In spite of the voluminous literature on the subject appearing since the middle of the last 
century, the dilemma for pricing theory in oligopoly today is not much different than the way it 
was described in Rothschild (1947). There are analytical models based on axioms, such as profit 
maximisation, yielding exact results but only under very narrow conditions that avoid the general 
indeterminateness of price in oligopoly. There are also general theories that emphasise the 
struggle for position in oligopoly and capture features of pricing that result, such as price rigidity 
and mark-up pricing. Neither approach is fully satisfactory in terms of rigour, realism and 
usefulness for economic modelling. Rothschild’s consistent argument in favour of openness in 
dealing with this dilemma is still relevant and helpful as are the closing sentences of his 1947 
article, 
 
‘But the undiscovered territory must be entered by economic theory if it is not to lose all 
touch with reality. The tentative first step outlined in the previous section certainly looks 
very crude and pedestrian when compared with the polished elegance of modern value 
theory. But it is tentative steps of this sort which economic analysis must undertake to-
day.’ (Rothschild, 1947, p.320) 
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